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Introduction
Recovery from mental illness is a hotly contested topic. Pro-psychiatric groups like the
National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) tout medication as a tool that makes life livable;
skeptical groups like Mind Freedom International (MFI) see medication and diagnosis as part of
the problem. These conflicting notions of recovery reflect competing models of mental illness,
which can be classified into two broad categories: medical and social. People with mental
illnesses are often left to find their own way between these poles, trying to reconcile lived
experience with binaristic representations of recovery.
In this project, I aim to complicate the binary oppositions that so often inform the
discourse surrounding mental illness. First, drawing on concepts from disability studies, I
investigate the evolution, implications, and limitations of different models of mental illness.
Then, I explore the ways in which narrative works as an imperfect but functional tool to navigate
a hybrid path between models. Choosing particular written artifacts as rhetorical case studies, I
analyze how advocates mobilize narrative in promoting hybrid visions of recovery. Throughout,
I intersperse fragments of my own experience with mental illness that illustrate the complexity of
defining, let alone realizing, recovery. I aim to show that binaristic models of mental illness fail
to capture the nonlinear, contingent, and—frankly—maddening nature of recovery from mental
illness.
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Disability Theory and Madness
My primary lens for theorizing mental illness (a term I will use interchangeably with
madness) is disability theory. 1 Scholars of disability are devoting increasing attention to
madness, conceptualizing it as a kind of mental disability. A recent issue of Disability Studies
Quarterly with the theme “Madness and Disability” exemplifies this trend. In their introduction
to this issue, editors Noam Ostrander and Bruce Henderson describe how disability studies can
be used “to trouble the borders of normal/abnormal and sane/insane.” In seeking to trace and
destabilize popular attitudes toward recovery from mental illness, I hope that my work, too, will
trouble the borders of such binaries.
The Medical Model: Recovery as Binary?
Binaristic conceptions not only of mental illness but of disability in general can be traced,
in large part, to longstanding medical approaches. Disability theorist Tobin Siebers succinctly
summarizes the medical model of disability:
Briefly, the medical model defines disability as a property of the individual body
that requires medical intervention. (25)
That is to say, in much medical discourse, disabilities are framed as diseases that must be
overcome, or at least battled, through medical treatment. The term disability, in this conception,
is essentially synonymous with illness or impairment. The complexity and variety of disabled
people’s lives and circumstances tends to be overlooked, with doctors, caregivers, and other
would-be allies instead focusing on the “cure or elimination” of the impairment in question (3).
In other words, able-bodiedness is defined as the absence of disability. Within a cure-or1

The term mental illness implicitly endorses a medical model of the mind; after all, the word illness is present in the
term itself. Disability scholars, who tend to favor social constructionist rather than medical approaches, therefore
prefer to use the term madness. I use the two terms interchangeably in hopes of blurring this distinction; after all, my
goal in this project is to negotiate a hybrid path between paradigms too often represented as mutually exclusive.
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eliminate approach to impairment, ability and disability—and, accordingly, sanity and insanity—
are thus positioned as polar opposites.
For much of the twentieth century, medical treatments of mental illness were based on a
cure-or-eliminate approach. Chief among these treatments were Freudian psychoanalysis and the
lobotomy, a surgical procedure that has since been discredited. The medical doctor and historian
Mical Raz has examined how these two treatment modalities, despite their apparent differences,
gave rise to a shared, medicalized discourse of psychiatry. She notes that “tens of thousands of
lobotomies were performed on Americans in order to treat and cure mental illness” between
1935 and 1965 with “very little opposition [from] psychoanalytically oriented psychiatrists”
(387, emphasis mine; 388). Indeed, the two modalities operated in tandem; typically, a patient
subjected to a lobotomy would subsequently receive psychoanalytic talk therapy. Raz discusses
how Walter Freeman, a physician who personally performed more than 3,500 lobotomies,
frequently framed his work in psychoanalytic terms. For example, Freeman claimed that during
“nearly a quarter of a century” spent performing lobotomies he had “been hunting the Super
Ego,” asserting that lobotomy constituted “the solution of the most malignant forms of Super
Ego dominance” (Freeman qtd. in Raz 410). By the same token, the psychoanalyst John Rosen
compared the “sever[ing] of connections in the brain [i.e. lobotomy] with the severing of the
connections between schizophrenics and their mothers” (411). Within this entwined psychiatric
discourse, lobotomy combined with psychoanalysis was thus represented as a “solution” or
“cure” that eliminated psychological malignancies.
Within public discourse more broadly, the cure-or-eliminate approach exemplified by
lobotomy helped to reinforce a sane/insane dichotomy. Diefenbach et al., a group of
psychological and media scholars, examine popular reportage on the lobotomy between 1935
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and 1960. In earlier coverage especially, the moment at which the patient receives the lobotomy
represents a dramatic break between a preceding period of illness and a post-op period of
recovery. For example, a news article from 1941 portrays the procedure in glowing terms:
From problems to their families and nuisances to themselves, from ineffectives
and unemployables, many… have been transformed into useful members of
society. (Kaempffert qtd. in Diefenbach et al. 65)
In this account, recovery from mental illness is nothing less than a transformation. The pre-op
insanity of “nuisances” and “unemployables” is contrasted with the post-op sanity of “useful
members of society.” A Time magazine article from 1942 expresses the same contrast in direr
terms, warning that mentally ill people who failed to obtain lobotomies risked an “unchanged
psychotic personality leading to complete insanity” (65). Sanity is represented as easily
distinguishable from insanity, with medical treatment resulting in complete and recognizable
recovery from mental illness.
Contemporary Medicalization: Recovery as Continuum
Today, an epoch of psychoanalysis and lobotomy has given way to an emphasis on
psychiatric drugs. The journalist and science writer Robert Whitaker, in his book Mad in
America, traces contemporary psychiatric practices back to the invention of the antipsychotic
Thorazine in 1953. Thorazine seemed to have an unprecedented degree of success in treating the
psychosis that can accompany mental disorders such as schizophrenia and manic depression
(now known as bipolar disorder). Whitaker questions whether Thorazine and subsequent
psychiatric drugs have actually been as effective as they are reputed to be; however, a thorough
investigation of the science behind medication would exceed the scope of this paper. What is
important from a rhetorical standpoint is that Thorazine and other drugs have, especially since
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the ‘60s, been represented as the most effective means of treating mental illness and therefore
vital to recovery.
The creation and popularization of the chemical imbalance hypothesis of mental illness
serves as the basis for such representations. This hypothesis picked up steam in the ‘60s,
following the invention of the antidepressant drugs iproniazid and imipramine. These drugs,
which both worked on the neurotransmitters (brain chemicals) serotonin and norepinephrine,
seemed to improve symptoms of depression. Consequently, some researchers theorized that
depression was caused by a deficit of those neurotransmitters. As Whitaker writes, “the NIMH’s
Joseph Schildkraut, in a paper published in the Archives
of General Psychiatry, reviewed this body of research
and set forth a chemical imbalance theory of affective
disorders” in 1965 (62). Since then, this theory has
become a cornerstone of pro-psychiatric rhetoric.
Doctors, as Whitaker describes, regularly draw upon the
language of chemical imbalance in explaining
psychiatric conditions to their patients and prescribing
psychotropic medication (97). The notion that madness is
caused by chemical imbalance is invoked in claims that
psychiatric drugs treat symptoms by balancing brain

January 2010
The doctor tells me I've had a
panic attack. She says I have a
"chemical imbalance." That I may
need medication for the rest of my
life.
The idea is comforting: With
proper treatment, I can manage my
feelings. And it feels right. For as long
as I can remember, I've been
inundated by rhetoric that portrays
mental disorders as lifelong,
biological illnesses best treated with
medication. I think of TV commercials
where sad people take drugs and
become happy. I’m willing to give it a
try.
She prescribes an antidepressant
for daily use and Xanax for the bad
days.

chemicals and, therefore, address the root cause.
The contemporary model of the chemical imbalance does ameliorate some of the
binaristic excesses of the previous psychoanalytic/surgical paradigm. To begin with, in modern
psychiatric practice, the idea of treating a root cause is distinguished from curing or eliminating
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the underlying illness. Rhetoric posted on the website of the National Alliance on Mental Illness
(NAMI), the largest and most well-known mental health advocacy group in the United States,
reflects this distinction. In online factsheets about specific conditions, such as ObsessiveCompulsive Disorder, NAMI recapitulates the medicalized notion that mental illnesses are
caused by chemical imbalances that medication can address (Duckworth and Freedman 1).
However, in a more generalized discussion of recovery, NAMI does not portray these
medications as curing those conditions:
Mental health medications do not cure mental illness. However, they can often
significantly improve symptoms and help promote recovery and are recognized as
first-line treatment for most individuals. (“Treatment and Services”)
This quotation illustrates how contemporary psychiatric practice is focused on helping patients
cope with symptoms rather than promising to eliminate those symptoms entirely. There is a
marked difference between claims that medications can “improve” symptoms and “help
promote” recovery and the exuberant endorsements of transformative treatment that
characterized the era of the lobotomy. Psychiatry today has thus come to conceive of recovery in
more measured and incremental terms.
Medicalization and Advocacy Discourse
While contemporary medical practices allow for a continuum of recovery, pro-psychiatric
advocates sometimes appropriate medicalized language to promote a more simplified and
binaristic view. For example, even as NAMI asserts that mental disorders cannot be cured, the
organization distinguishes rigidly between treated and untreated mental illness in a af ctsheet
called “About Recovery.” The factsheet first defines recovery as “a process, beginning with
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diagnosis and eventually moving into successful management of your illness.” To support this
definition, the factsheet then frames madness in explicitly medical terms:
Severe mental illnesses are treatable disorders of the brain. Left untreated,
however, they are among the most disabling and destructive illnesses known to
humankind. […] Stigma, shame, discrimination, unemployment, homelessness,
criminalization, social isolation, poverty, and premature death mark the lives of
most individuals with the most severe and persistent mental illnesses. (“About
Recovery”)
The statement above is clearly intended to elicit the reader’s interest by raising concern about a
“disabling and destructive” societal problem. But it also achieves a subtler aim: By equating
“[s]evere mental illnesses” to “treatable disorders of the brain,” the statement above embraces a
medical model of the mind.
The factsheet proceeds to present medication as the best available solution to this societal
problem:
Science has greatly expanded our understanding and treatment of severe mental
illnesses. […] Newer classes of medications can better treat individuals with
severe mental illnesses and with far fewer side effects. (“About Recovery”)
Recovery, having been explicitly defined as “successful management of your illness” and
implicitly equated to medical treatment, is here represented as a fairly straightforward matter of
compliance with a medication regimen. The “disabling and destructive” effects of mental
disorders “left untreated” are contrasted with the ostensibly scientifically-validated healing
power of psychiatric drugs. This treated/untreated dichotomy reiterates the sane/insane—i.e.
abled/disabled—binary that disability studies seeks to complicate.
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But what if “recovery” is sometimes more
complicated than simply complying with a
medication regimen? What if medication sometimes
makes the patient worse? And, regardless of how
effective medical treatment may be for some patients,
what effect does the medical model have on the
identity formation and rhetorical participation of mad

August 2011
(Xanax withdrawal: month 4)
The inside of my skull is boiling
when I dart outside for a run. The air is
so heavy and wet it sticks to my lungs.
I think about heading back inside to
use the treadmill instead, but I’m afraid.
When I use the treadmill, I have to pay
careful attention to the numbers on its
display screen: distance traveled, time
elapsed, calories burned. If the digits of
those numbers don’t add up to
particular sums, then something horrible
will happen.

people as a whole?
Binaries, Oppression, and Identity Politics
Historical medical practices, along with some contemporary medicalized discourse,
uphold binaries that distinguish rigidly between sane and insane, treated and untreated. Siebers
discusses how such attitudes, which he conceptualizes as an “ideology of ability,” work to
exclude disabled people from full and equitable participation in public discourse (7). The
ideology of ability "alienates the individual [with disabilities] as a defective person" (72). This
alienation is particularly pronounced for mad people. After all, per NAMI’s aforementioned
“About Recovery” factsheet, mental disorders are widely considered to be “destructive,” a
stigma that reinforces the sane/insane binary. Siebers argues that this kind of alienation hinders
"the ability of people with disabilities to organize politically" (72). Due to its size, funding, and
institutional heft, a group such as NAMI exerts extensive rhetorical influence in propagating
sane/insane and treated/untreated binaries. By contrast, due to these very dichotomies, it is
difficult for mad people to form advocacy groups of their own or otherwise participate in
discourse.
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Despite some progress, then, the medical model continues to prevent disabled people
from identity politics effectively and, consequently, has a dehumanizing effect. Siebers observes
that "it is extremely unlikely [in this model] that a blind person will be allowed to take a
leadership position in the blind community, let alone in the sighted community" (72-73,
emphasis mine). Notice the words “be allowed”; rather than disabled people choosing their own
leaders, nondisabled caregivers and other allies are privileged as decision-makers. PhebeAnn
Wolframe points out a similar way in which medicalization impedes mad activism specifically:
Mad people's political affiliations (for example, choosing to take part in a public
protest) [...] can similarly be framed as symptoms within the context of having
been given a psychiatric diagnosis.
Relative to disabled people in general, mad people thus face a unique burden in trying to
organize politically: Activism can itself be construed as a symptom and, on those grounds, their
rhetoric can be excluded from public discourse. The rhetorician and disability scholar Catherine
Prendergast points out that this sort of exclusion denies full rhetorical citizenship and, indeed,
personhood to mentally disabled people (“On the Rhetorics” 57). Overall, such rhetorical
disenfranchisement illustrates how, although psychiatry has made some progress toward
conceptualizing recovery as a continuum, medicalized binaries retain enduring discursive force.
The Social Model
In order to combat such oppression, disability scholars have tended to favor social
constructionist rather than medical perspectives. Siebers positions the social model in opposition
to its medical alternative:
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The social model opposes the medical model by defining disability relative to the
social and built environment, arguing that disabling environments produce
disability in bodies and require interventions at the level of social justice. (25)
In this model, a state of disability is not a quality of an individual body but rather a question of
context. Disability becomes re-imagined as a social construct that emerges out of interactions
between people and their built and social environments. Consider a person who has a vision
impairment. The social model would argue that myriad architectural and social features of that
person's surroundings actually create his/her state of disability. Architecturally speaking,
crosswalks with visual but not auditory cues would make it more difficult for that person to get
from place to place independently; socially speaking, discrimination in hiring continues to this
day (Kwoh). Within an accessibly-designed context, that person would cease to be disabled. 2
Social constructionists, then, do not endorse an abled/disabled binary, for they do not
deem bodies to be either inherently able or impaired. Rather, they stress the need to redesign
inaccessible environments and reshape prejudicial attitudes in order to create a more equitable
society for people of all bodies. That is to say, they take a social justice approach rather than a
cure-or-eliminate approach. Social constructionists recognize how what the disability theorist
and literary scholar Rosemarie Garland-Thomson calls the “opposing twin figures” of abled and
disabled—for our purposes, sane and insane—work together to “legitimate a system of social,
economic, and political empowerment” that privileges the abled and sane (Thomson qtd. in
Lewis 116). The social constructionist goal is to destabilize these dichotomies and build more
accessible environments for all people.

2

Siebers provides a historical illustration of how the social environment can determine whether a condition is
disabling or not: “Deafness was not, for instance, a disability on Martha’s Vineyard for most of the eighteenth
century because one in twenty-five residents was deaf and everyone in the community knew how to sign. Deaf
villagers had the same occupations and incomes as hearing people (Shapiro 1993, 86)” (74).

13

Social constructionism creates a space where disabled minority identities can thrive. In
Siebers's account, the social model has "changed the landscape of thinking about disability
because it refuses to represent people with disabilities as defective citizens and because its focus
on the built environment presents a common cause around which they may organize politically"
(73). People with disabilities, organized around this common paradigm, have come together to
form politically potent identity groupings. Such organization has resulted in important successes.
By practicing identity politics, disabled people have secured legal protections such as the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and begun to make headway against discriminatory
environments and attitudes.
Social Constructionism and Mad Pride
One model of madness closely related to the social model of disability is the Mad Pride
movement. Mad Pride, it should be noted, is not a monolithic bloc but rather a coalition of
activists who self-identify in different ways. The three most notable identity groupings within
Mad Pride are consumers, survivors, and ex-patients, which in conjunction are referred to as
C/S/X. Consumers do not call for our current mode of mental health treatment to be abolished
altogether but advocate reforms to reduce coercion and increase choice. Survivors and expatients, meanwhile, emphasize the harm that psychiatric treatment can cause, pointing to
medical and judicial coercion as well as the debilitating side effects and withdrawal symptoms
that can result from use of psychiatric drugs.
The disability scholar Bradley Lewis reviews the history of Mad Pride. He situates its
origins during the 1970s in relation to other social justice activism, particularly the disability
rights movement. “Early founders of the movement,” Lewis writes,” “shared common
experiences of being treated with disrespect, disregard, and discrimination at the hands of
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psychiatry”; meanwhile, activists in the burgeoning disability movement also expressed
discontent with callous and dehumanizing medical treatment (118). These common origins
reflect common goals.
In subsequent decades, though, the two movements have grown apart. Building on
Lewis’s research, Nev Jones and Robyn Lewis Brown, scholars of disability and madness,
discuss persistent tension between the fields:
[T]he historical and sub-cultural trajectories of the consumer/survivor/ex-patient
(c/s/x) and disability rights movements have diverged significantly, and
individuals involved with both movements have at times accused each other of
implicit ableism or saneism.
One point of contention is that C/S/X perspectives remain underrepresented in academe—even
within disability studies itself. Another more fundamental issue is that services for mental health
users and people with other disabilities “have developed independently of one another, draw on
different private and federal funding sources, and employ clinicians and providers with divergent
training and disciplinary backgrounds.” These different social landscapes result in different sorts
of lived experiences for mad people on the one hand and people with other kinds of disabilities
on the other.
Still, reflecting the intersections of these two fields, C/S/X advocacy draws on many of
the same concepts and arguments as the social model of disability. Like disability activists, Mad
Pride activists speak from a social constructionist standpoint to refute medicalized binaries and
ableist/saneist privilege. Jones and Brown observe that “criticisms of biomedical and cognitivist
models of mental illness are consistent with the repudiation of medical and moral models of
disability in favor of broadly social models that acknowledge social, cultural and structural
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forces.” As C/S/X discourse points out, much of the distress associated with madness actually
stems not from the symptoms themselves but from stigma, shame, lack of employment
opportunities, and other factors in the built and social environment. Hence, as Jones and Brown
argue, “disability studies can clearly provide a forum for discussing issues concerning
psychiatric disability or diversity.”
January 2011
The Xanax starts to have bad
side effects. Now that I'm taking the
drug every day, people are telling
me that my personality has changed.
I seem "foggy" and irritable; I'm
forgetting things. And, although I
don't yet know it, my brain has
become physically dependent on
Xanax.

Although potential coalitions of c/s/x and
disability activists are still emerging, the Mad Pride
movement has attained vital victories of its own.
Lewis writes that a turning point for the movement
came in 2003: a hunger strike targeting a trade
organization for psychiatrists during which

participants “demanded evidence that mental and emotional distress results from ‘chemical
imbalances’ in the brain” (115). After initially stonewalling, the American Psychiatric
Association (APA) replied in writing that “brain science has not advanced to the point where
scientists or clinicians can point to readily discernible pathological lesions or genetic
abnormalities that in and of themselves serve as a reliable or predictive biomarkers of a given
mental disorder,” a response that, like the strike, was widely reported in national media (APA
qtd. in Lewis 124). Following this admission from the APA, Mad Pride activists leveraged their
national stage to defeat planned budget cuts to peer support products. By framing mental
disorders not as defects of the individual but as forms of socially-constructed oppression, Mad
Pride has created a discourse within which mad people can claim minority identities for
themselves and practice the kind of identity politics that Siebers envisions.
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MindFreedom Advocacy: Reductivist Recovery
Social constructionism is far from a panacea, and Mad Pride does not offer a perfect fit
for every mentally ill person. Socially-oriented advocacy rhetoric can at times lapse into
reductive, wholesale dismissal of medical models of treatment. Online advocacy literature
created by the Mad Pride organization MindFreedom International (MFI) exemplifies this risk.
For example, on a Frequently Asked Questions page, MFI makes a sweeping statement about
psychiatric diagnoses:
[Diagnostic] labels are words that are put on others without their permission.
MindFreedom helps turn the tables. For more than a decade, MindFreedom has
helped promote and network groups and individuals who celebrate "Mad Pride."
(“MindFreedom”)
Diagnoses of mental disorder can certainly be used oppressively; as Wolframe notes, political or
religious involvement is often seen as suspect in the context of a mental health diagnosis. On the
other hand, many people choose to seek a diagnosis
following months or years of severe distress and, upon
being diagnosed, use their “labels” to obtain
appropriate medical treatment, accommodations, and
other positive valences. The blanket statement that
diagnoses are “words that are put on others without

December 2009
My heart is throbbing so hard
that I think it will force its way out of
my chest. The physical sensations
are scary—the racing heart, the
gasps for air, the trembling of my
hands.
But the really scary part is that I
think I'm having a heart attack. I'm
convinced that I'm about to die.

their permission” fails to consider the complex, nuanced, and varied circumstances in which
different mad people live. Indeed, the “consumer” aspect of C/S/X recognizes that many mad
activists continue to draw on medication, therapy, and other medical approaches to recovery.
One tool for recovery that epitomizes this medical/social blending is narrative.
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Why Narrative?
Narratives can offer further insight into medical and social conceptions of recovery and
into potential intersections of the two paradigms. Interestingly, medical and social perspectives
alike vest narrative with purported therapeutic power. In both paradigms, the act of writing one’s
story is seen as potentially healing, while reading a firsthand account of madness is presumed to
offer insight into the experience. This preoccupation with narrative reveals a fundamental flaw in
both models: a desire to structure, to order, to fix. Furthermore, rhetors working within both
medical and social models often share personal stories to promote particular visions of recovery.
Accounts of personal experience thus function in multiple, intersecting ways to codify
assumptions about and approaches to recovery from mental illness.
Narrative as Healing Rhetoric
Narrative is often represented as a kind of rhetoric uniquely vested with healing potential
for both rhetor and audience. For example, people with mental illnesses are often encouraged to
keep journals in the context of medical treatment. In Dialectical Behavioral Therapy (DBT), one
of the most popular treatment modalities for mental disorders, patients track their symptoms and
coping techniques day-to-day using worksheets and diary cards. This kind of quotidian selfnarration is presumed to be helpful to patients in studying and managing their symptoms
(Koerner and Linehan 84). By the same token, friends and relatives of mentally ill people, along
with clinicians in training, are urged to read firsthand accounts of madness in order to understand
better their loved ones’ or patients’ conditions. The medical doctor and literary scholar Stephen
T. Moran, looking at narratives of depression by Hemingway and other notable authors, writes
that “it may be helpful for clinicians to study narratives of illness” because such narratives
convey the “heterogeneity” of patients’ lived experience (79). He coins the term
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“autopathography” to describe life-writing about illness. In these contexts, autopathography is
represented as a tool that helps patients to manage their own symptoms and that assists others in
supporting patients.
The rhetorician Jacqueline Rinaldi echoes this view, portraying narrative as a kind of
therapeutic knowledge production. She proposes a "therapeutic rhetoric" based on her experience
helping seven students to write about their "struggles with disability" (822, 825). She writes:
Though writing and revising narratives of disability could not restore the crippled
bodies of these writers, the insights learned from the heuristics of writing did
seem to have therapeutic value for those grappling with the darker issues of
chronic illness. (831)
In Rinaldi’s account, narrative’s benefit to disabled people is that it assists them in coming to
terms with their symptoms and gaining “insights” into their conditions. Implicitly, then, the
disabled writers must have lacked insight prior to writing their narratives. It would seem that
lived experience is not sufficient, in itself, to generate knowledge; it must be reflected upon—
ordered—fixed in writing.
Rinaldi’s argument comports with the work of the rhetorician Jim Corder, who contends
that narrative is essential to the formation of all knowledge. He argues that, “[w]hether
consciously or not, we always station ourselves somewhere in our narratives when we use
language” (17). In turn, he presents all knowledge as dependent on language; writing with James
Baumlin, he characterizes knowledge as “language-based” and “language-bound” (Corder and
Baumlin 465). If language use always emerges out of narrative, and if knowledge always
originates in language, then all knowledge stems from narrative.
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Within a framework where all knowledge is narrated, all knowledge must also be
subjective. Accordingly, Corder and Baumlin exhort scholars to eschew methodologies that
aspire toward objectivity; they argue that true objectivity is neither possible not desirable. In
hewing to methodologies that produce "fact papers" rather than "opinion papers," scholars
assume a rhetorical posture of objectivity, but the production of knowledge remains inherently
subjective (464). Corder and Baumlin call for academic inquiry to be re-imagined around the
principle that "as opinion derives from research, research is opinion; research is, at every stage,
interpretation" (465). In breaking down the barriers between research and opinion—between
knowledge and interpretation—scholars can liberate themselves from "the tyranny of certain
models over our conception of fact and knowledge" (469). So-called "objectivity," in this
reading, is not conceptualized as an avenue for discovering capital-T Truth. Rather, objectivity is
reframed as an ideological mode of knowledge-production that valorizes itself by dismissing
competing modes as "opinion."
Corder and Baumlin are hardly the first scholars to challenge notions of objectivity; nor
have they been the last. Unlike other critics in this vein, however, their description of subjectivity
as necessarily narrated lends an interesting perspective to portrayals of autopathography as a
mode of healing. In both Rinaldi’s and Corder and Baumlin’s work, narrative structure is
presented as an ideal mode for producing and ordering subjective knowledge, a process resulting
in healing. Looked at in conjunction, then, the perspectives of these rhetoricians evince a
worldview where language, narrative, knowledge, and healing are inextricably intertwined.
Though narrative cannot, as Rinaldi acknowledges, mend “crippled bodies,” might it not be
beneficial for mental disorder?
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Problems with Narrating Mental Illness
Prendergast raises a fundamental issue with attempts to prescribe narrative as a tool for
recovering from madness: People with certain mental disorders may be incapable of constructing
coherent narratives, or at least narratives that are recognizable as such. She questions “the
therapeutic value of rich, descriptive, and ambiguous narratives,” especially for people with
conditions that interfere with normative language use, noting that “too often [these narratives’
therapeutic] value is assumed” (“On the Rhetorics” 55). These kinds of narratives, especially in
the case of a disorder like schizophrenia, reflect exceptional experiences. Prendergast argues that
a typical or “unexceptional” experience of madness is likely to be characterized by fluctuating
circumstances and degrees of impairment (“The Unexceptional Schizophrenic” 61). The desire to
fix mad experiences with narratives reflects that “the public does not want to allow for
fluctuation between states, and even less for the possibility that both states exist at once” (61).
Corderian notions of narrated subjectivity become troubled within this frame. While a
writer reflecting on a past experience of depression may be able to write cogently and vividly, a
writer in the midst of florid psychosis is unlikely to be capable of the same. The idea that
narrative is central to subjectivity therefore borders on saneism; the internal lives of people with
language impairments are conceptualized as being less generative of knowledge. Within a strong
Corderian paradigm, where knowledge and narrative are seen as essentially synonymous, people
incapable of normative narration could be characterized as lacking any knowledge at all!
More insidiously, readers of firsthand accounts may not realize that they are only being
exposed to a narrow subset of mad experience, which reinforces ableist and saneist assumptions.
Disability scholar and rhetorician Margaret Price examines the “hegemonic history” of the
autopathography. Responding to Moran’s piece, she notes that “Moran selects for attention only
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‘unusually articulate’ and quite canonical ‘sufferers,’” reflecting a larger societal tendency to
focus on conventionally articulate stories of extreme mental states (178). Writers with more
profound language impairments, or whose experiences resist linguistic expression, may lack
reliable Web access and a safe place in which to write, let alone the ability to publish in print
form a memoir about mental illness. Perhaps the problem is that readers expect such a degree of
comprehensibility and structure when reading narrative. These complications speak to the
potentially oppressive effects of assumptions—per Rinaldi and Corder and Baumlin—that
subjectivity should be structured in order to count as knowledge.
Because such a limited range of mad people’s lived knowledge is able to find linguistic
expression, the narratives that do get written represent a skewed sample—one that runs the risk
of recapitulating harmful binaries. The people who do write “unusually articulate” accounts of
madness tend to be those who either respond well to medication or whose symptoms resolve on
their own; people contending with ongoing symptoms of mental illness are more likely to find
articulate self-expression beyond their grasp.
Another fundamental issue with the notion of therapeutic narrative is the presumption
that structured subjectivity—an ordered self, fixed in writing—is desirable in the first place.
Siebers helps to complicate this presumption in describing the body as "vital and chaotic,”
asserting that it "possess[es] complexity in equal share to that claimed today by critical and
cultural theorists for linguistic systems" (26). The body, in this account, becomes a set of
systems vested with complexity and significance that precede, inform, and rival language use.
Unlike the written word, the body is not fixed and linear, but rather “chaotic.”3 The idea of the
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Of course, many scholars would dispute whether the written word is necessarily fixed and linear. The same caveat
applies to narrative in particular. For example, Ochs and Capps—like Corder—examine narrative as a lived process,
finding that children are especially likely to produce “nonlinear narratives” (88). Moreover, narrative need not be
reduced to the written word alone; Wolf discusses how video games present dynamic, “maze”-like narratives using
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body as capable of signification even absent language provides a welcome counterpoise to
Corder and Baumlin’s theory. Indeed, Siebers criticizes the limitations and inflexibility of
theorists who interpret "nearly all symbolic behavior in strictly linguistic terms" (2). He positions
this critique within a larger argument about the potential for disabled bodies to exert rhetorical
force—an argument to which I will later return. For now, suffice it to say that disability theory
allows for lived knowledge that transgresses norms in ways so fundamental as to resist linguistic
expression.

Ethos in Tatters
From my story—depending on how I might tell it—you might take
away that I was a non-compliant patient and serial medication-quitter.
Or you might see me as a melodramatic malingerer, someone who
overreacted to adolescent anxiety.
Was I never really all that sick? Or am I still sick and in denial?
Maybe I do need medication. Maybe I will need medication.
What do I know about mental illness? I'm not objective. I'm not
fair. I'm (chemically?) imbalanced.

“visual grammar” (109, 94). However, as Prendergast argues, subjectivity is strongly associated with the ability to
speak and write in conventionally coherent ways, and conventions of coherence privilege linear, fixed storytelling.
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Mobilizing Narrative
Apart from its purported therapeutic benefits, narrative is regularly deployed in defense
of various notions of recovery from mental illness. The narratives examined below should not be
considered representative of mad people’s experiences; as discussed above, only a limited and
atypical subset of mad people produce conventionally articulate autopathographies. Nor should
each story even be considered representative of all narratives deployed in service of a given
model. Mad people ascribe to different visions of recovery for so many different reasons, within
so many different circumstances: Some use medication; some do not; some suffer debilitating
withdrawals from that medication; some endure terrible trauma; and issues of gender, race, class,
and other social factors inflect all of these experiences.
I do not intend for the narratives examined here to serve as referenda on entire models.
Indeed, though each narrative does stress either a medical or social perspective, each draws on
elements of the opposite perspective as well, showing how models tend to blend in practice.
Rather, these two stories are intended to serve as rhetorical case studies. The purpose of these
case studies is to show how autopathography, as a form for codifying lived knowledge, requires
rhetors to make choices that artificially order and fix experiences of madness. These particular
narratives were selected because, in assigning order to their experiences, the writers reinforce
troubling binaries.
Recovery As Coping and Compliance: The Treatment Advocacy Center’s Medicalized Narration
The Treatment Advocacy Center (TAC), founded by psychiatrist E. Fuller Torrey in
1998, favors aggressive medical treatment of mental illness. The group advocates a mode of
treatment known as Assisted Out-Patient (AOT), which enables states to compel mentally ill
people to obtain treatment without actually committing them to institutions. TAC favors this kind
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of forcible treatment because it considers the decision not to take medication to be, itself, a
symptom of mental illness. This kind of catch-22 is similar to what Wolframe describes, where
mad people’s political affiliations and other choices are sometimes dismissed as mere symptoms.
TAC’s rhetoric makes frequent references to “recovery” from mental illness. In a post
titled “Medication: The Foundation of Recovery,” Edward G. Francell, Jr.—a former member of
the TAC Board of Directors who himself “suffers from manic-depression [bipolar disorder]”—
describes his own experience and encourages others to obtain medical treatment. He uses his
story to argue that compliance with a medication regimen is indispensible in recovery from
mental illness.
Francell begins the essay by defining mental illness in terms that guide readers to a
particular vision of recovery:
For many consumers, proper medication management can provide the necessary
foundation for recovery from neurobiological disorder (mental illness).
In equating “mental illness” to “neurobiological disorder,” he frames mad experience in medical
terms, setting up “proper medication management” as the primary mode of treatment. As when
the National Alliance on Mental Illness equates “mental illnesses” and “brain disorder,” the
framing of mental illness as “neurobiological disorder” sets up an essentially foregone
conclusion that meds are the best response: It is only natural to assume that medical treatment is
the optimal response to a medical problem. Francell’s description of “proper medication
management” as the “necessary foundation for recovery” fits naturally into his medicalized
definition of madness.
Francell returns throughout the essay to a theme of “compliance” and stresses social
support as a means of ensuring compliance. For example, he recommends support groups on the
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grounds that they help “keep you [the patient] compliant [with medication].” By the same token,
he suggests to family members and other allies that “good-natured pestering can help
compliance.” These recommendations evince a curious infusion of social concerns into medical
modality. Social factors become incorporated into medical treatment, combined into a rhetoric of
recovery-as-compliance.
Francell’s definition of recovery reveals a similar hybridity. He repudiates the cure-oreliminate attitude of older medical approaches, writing that “[r]ecovery does not mean getting rid
of the illness.” Nor does he blinker his vision of recovery by limiting it solely to the medical
realm. While med compliance may be the “foundation” of recovery, he envisions the process as
involving much more than simply symptom management. To Francell, recovery means “gaining
back a sense of control, a sense of purpose in life.” In discussing the complex and incremental
nature of such recovery, he even incorporates tenets from the social model of disability, referring
to “the years lost to the illness, the loss of friends, societal stigma, and the pain of being ill itself”
as “secondary disabilities.” Disability, here, is not being defined purely as biomedical
impairment but as a mix of biological and social factors. In treating this kind of disability,
psychiatric treatment represents a starting point, but social factors cannot be neglected.
Francell cites his own story to develop this hybrid vision of recovery. He writes:
I moved in and out of the hospital from about age 18 to 22, and “field tested”
about 10 drugs in the process, until a second opinion found me a stabilizing
medication. It was then that the slow process of recovery actually began.
Francell’s lengthy journey deserves respect and illustrates the benefit that some mad people do
realize from medical treatment. At the same time, he describes profound side effects that
complicate the cost/benefit analysis. For example:
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Dystonia is a drug reaction that can be very subjectively unpleasant, where the
throat muscles become rigid, like a powerful invisible force grabbing you by the
neck and holding you off the ground. Dystonia scared the hell out of me, and
made me feel helpless, rather like falling into quicksand.
Another side effect approaches potentially life-threatening levels:
[L]ithium once caused me to drink so much water it was backing up my
esophagus and I was literally drowning
Francell describes these side effects as “controllable” and credits medication with his ability to
function day-to-day. He also thanks his mother for helping to make sure that he continued taking
his meds even when side effects were hard to tolerate. Recovery is thus represented as a complex
calculus where symptom management, side effects, and social support must all be weighed.
Francell, then, writes honestly and vividly of both medical challenges such as symptoms
and side effects and social challenges such as stigma. However, despite this blended approach,
his autopathography does reinforce a treated/untreated binary. In terms of the content of the
story, Francell represents treatment as so crucial—so vastly preferable to untreated madness—as
to be worth the risk of drowning one’s own lungs in retained fluid. The placement of Francell’s
text on the TAC website also reinforces this binary. Francell’s position as a patient who
responded relatively well to medication is what enables him both to write an articulate story in
the first place and to share his story on the TAC’s website; because his lived experience of
madness comports with TAC’s agenda, he is given a platform to share it.
Francell’s story, like the rhetorical theories of Rinaldi and Corder and Baumlin, frames
mental illness as something to be fixed in multiple senses of the word. At one point, he quotes an
unnamed “consumer with schizophrenia”:
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I once knew a consumer with schizophrenia who had a lot of restlessness, or a
side effect called akathisia, who made the greatest statement about side effects I
have ever heard. He said, “When I look good, I feel bad. When I look bad, I feel
good.”
The subjective unpleasantness of dystonia or akathisia, in
this account, is preferable to untreated schizophrenia,
further reflecting the treated/untreated binary. Moreover,
the ability to function socially—to “look good”—is
privileged over a patient’s internal world. The chaotic
subjectivity of untreated mental illness is implicitly
framed as needing to be structured—through medication,

April 2011
After three months, the Xanax
isn't even helping me to sleep
anymore. I lie awake for hours every
night, my mind crawling, my feelings
flat.
When I tell the doctor that the
Xanax isn't working any more, she
says there are still antidepressants
we haven't tried yet.
I walk out. I'm done. That night, I
stop taking my meds.

narrative, or perhaps a combination.
Recovery As Overcoming: Ron Unger’s Social Constructionist Perspective
Ron Unger, a licensed clinical social worker, runs a site called Recovery from
“Schizophrenia” and Other “Psychotic Disorders.” Unger is a longtime MindFreedom
International (MFI) activist who promotes a vigorously social constructionist model of recovery.
His notion of recovery eschews the measured and incremental outlook of contemporary
psychiatric approaches; recovery, in Unger’s account, becomes a matter of discarding oppressive
psychiatric labels and embracing mad experience. As a result, though, Unger’s vision veers
toward an ableist cure-or-eliminate approach, reflecting a problematic theoretical underpinning
reminiscent of older medical practices.
Unger’s use of scare quotes in the site’s title around the words “schizophrenia” and
“psychotic disorders” immediately suggests his skepticism toward formal diagnostic categories.
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This rhetorical strategy works to situate Unger’s narrative within social constructionist advocacy,
reflecting Mad Pride hostility toward the idea of mental disorders as discrete disease entities.
Indeed, in a list of “Questions and Answers about Recovery” posted on the homepage, Unger
explains why he uses the scare quotes:
It often helps to see words like “schizophrenia” as just labels that psychiatrists use
when people have certain experiences and behave in certain ways [...] Recovery is
often facilitated when people focus directly on how to manage this stress and how
to reconsider their points of view and change their communication and their
behavior, rather than trying to fight or escape from some abstract entity such as
their alleged “schizophrenia.”
Psychiatric diagnoses, in Unger’s reading, are subjective constructs rather than diseases. It is
unsurprising that Unger, as an MFI activist, would echo MFI’s distrust of labels in his narrative
What does it mean to recover from a construct? Unger gives a definition of “recovery”
markedly more optimistic and transformative than Francell’s:
Recovery means having regained a meaningful life, no longer having a mental
health diagnosis, and no longer being in need of any sort of mental health
treatment.
Unger contrasts his definition with “the definitions used by some who suggest that recovery
should be thought of as learning how to have a better life, while continuing to be mentally ill and
needing treatment such as medications.” He proceeds to note that “full recovery is just a
possibility, not a requirement that anyone must fulfill in order to have a meaningful life”; without
condemning the decision to take meds, he offers the reader an alternative. His vision repudiates
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contemporary psychiatric practices oriented toward incremental improvement and, to some
readers, could provide an infusion of optimism.
More darkly, this conception of recovery is reminiscent of effusive press coverage of
medical treatment during the lobotomy’s heyday and takes on ableist overtones. In short, Unger
envisions the cure and elimination of mental illness. Despite Unger’s protest that full recovery is
just a “possibility, not a requirement,” the notion of “continuing to be mentally ill” is presented
as inherently less desirable than that of recovering fully. He explicitly describes mental disability
as inferior to nondisability by referring to persistent experiences of madness as “lesser degrees of
recovery.” In making these rhetorical moves, Unger portrays disability as something to be
overcome rather than a valuable form of diversity.
In sharing his story, Unger further develops this portrayal of recovery as overcoming. He
traces his own experiences of madness to childhood trauma and reports that, in his senior year of
high school, he started “getting a bit ‘grandiose’ or even ‘psychotic’” (“Personal Steps”). The
details of what Unger’s “madness” actually entailed are sparse; he focuses primarily on the
positive social and intellectual ramifications of being “creatively mad,” writing:
I was fortunate enough to find people who could see me as “mad” in an
interesting kind of way, and who had their own interest in challenging personal
and cultural identity. … I learned it was possible to challenge the limits of
everything we thought we knew, and at the same time think systematically.
Unger’s first experience with medical treatment came when he “sought counseling in [his] 30’s
to deal with unresolved trauma issues.” He does not report ever having used psych meds himself,
much less having been forced to accept treatment or incarcerated. Rather, he bases his vision of
recovery on years of experience as a social worker who took on “a role of supporting people to
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make their own thoughtful evaluations of the use or non-use of medications” and on decades of
activism with groups such as MFI. His own madness, he writes, occurred within “a safe
container”—a quality conspicuously absent from many others’ experiences (including
Francell’s), which may be characterized by persistent distress as well as the threat of
confinement.
Although shot through with veins of ableist sentiment and based on a somewhat
privileged ideal of safely-contained madness, Unger’s narrative does evince the liberatory
potential of Mad Pride. His challenge to diagnostic categories fits into a broader agenda of social
reform: Rather than endorsing medicalized modes of classification and treatment to manage
individuals’ impairments, Unger focuses on the role of social context in constructing mental
disability. As a solution, he calls for the creation of discursive spaces where diverse ways of
thinking and feeling are valued and madness can be safely experienced.
Unger's vision of recovery fits into a frame where mad minority identity thrives. But is it
practical? As someone who was harmed by psychotropic medication and no longer takes any
meds, I initially found his vision to be immensely appealing. The problem, though, is that living
post-meds has turned out to be messy—too messy for a narrative of overcoming, however
uplifting, to capture. On days when my anxiety has kept me awake for two days in a row, for
example, I’m less concerned with the question of etiology—of whether my symptoms are
biomedical or socially constructed in nature—and more concerned with how to cope. I value my
medication- free life, and claiming a minority identity as a mad (rather than sick) person has been
instrumental to me as I’ve built that life. Quitting meds and moving beyond a strictly medical
paradigm has helped me to reconceive of my experience—to find value and lived knowledge in
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my non-normative ways of thinking and feeling. Yet my symptoms are still distressing, and they
have not been eliminated. I have not been cured.
Indeed, to many people living with mental illnesses, Unger's vision seems more like a
mirage. A conversation posted on the blog Malingering Normal between Unger, an ex-patient
named Mary, and madness scholars Nev Jones and Timothy Kelly speaks to the limitations of
"full recovery." Kelly and Jones argue that Unger's experiences are not representative of mad
people generally. Jones asserts that a fleeting "psychotic- like" experience cannot meaningfully
be compared to "enduring, repeated psychosis–including very acute/florid forms." Kelly writes
that any such comparison is akin to comparing "apples and fire engines."
Reading this conversation, I become more
conscious of my own standpoint. Although I had anxiety
before starting Xanax, my more "severe symptoms"—to
rely again on medical terminology—only flared up during
the withdrawal. Even as I endured frightening changes, I
did so with the assurance that my perceptions would with
time return to what they had been. My thoughts and

July 2011
(Xanax withdrawal: month 3)
I took comfort. The things I was
experiencing—the perceptions so
unlike any I had ever had before—
would not be permanent. They were
the product of a temporary
disturbance in my biochemistry, one
that researchers had identified,
studied, and defined. I was able to
separate myself from my terrifying
perceptions, to conceptualize part of
my mind as other, as alien, as
disease.

feelings, in this frame, always seemed explicable and
transient—in a word, "safe." Though my anxiety lingers to this day, and though I wrestle with
the distress it causes, I feel secure in the knowledge that even the most exhausting bout of
insomnia or intrusive thoughts will pass.
The experiences described by Kelly and Jones lack this quality of safety and security.
Kelly writes of having "struggled with ongoing psychotic episodes beginning in adolescence that
have continued to recur in spite of trying many different things." Jones writes as "someone who
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has now been 'in the system' for 8 years, with on-going psychosis, and experience of multiple
forms of voluntary, involuntary and self-initiated treatment, discrimination, etc." Neither my
experiences nor Unger's can speak to this sort of persistent distress.
I am reminded, uncomfortably, of the problems with disability immersion. The idea of
immersion is that a nondisabled person can, by temporarily simulating an experience of
impairment, come to a deeper understanding of what it's like to live with a disability. Elizabeth J.
Donaldson has discussed immersion in the context of psychiatric disabilities. She describes how,
starting in the 1950s, mental health professionals ingested LSD in an attempt to simulate
psychosis. These researchers' experiences were well-intended attempts to become more
empathetic toward schizophrenic patients. Yet this kind of empathy should not be confused with
a genuine understanding of mad people's lived knowledge. During an immersion experience, the
certainty of a "return to 'normal perceptions and thoughts' and the distance from the threat of
insanity" differ fundamentally from the reality of many psychiatric disabilities. To claim a
familiarity with madness based on an immersion experience would be to appropriate a minority
identity from a position of privilege.
My withdrawal experience, though rather more protracted than a one-day trip on LSD,
arguably acquired the defining characteristic of a disability immersion experience: the assurance
of transience. The same might be said of Unger's narrative, in which he describes "exploring
madness within a safe container." The problem with a "safe container" is that it is not truly
immersive. For me or Unger to generalize would be simplistic at best and, as Kelly writes,
"offensive" to mad people whose experiences have not been so safe.
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Navigating Recovery Between and Beyond Models
The hybridity given voice in Francell’s and Unger’s stories points to a promising way
forward. While these stories incorporate different models in problematic ways, they do suggest
the potential of narrative to mediate between contending paradigms. The next step is to find a
way of destabilizing binary oppositions that does not fix and structure experiences. Siebers’s
concept of complex embodiment offers a framework for supra-linguistic hybridity.
Complex Embodiment
Siebers introduces this concept by describing the shortcomings of both medical and social
models of disability: “Some scholars complain that the medical model pays too much attention to
embodiment, while the social model leaves it out of the picture" (25). To address these
shortcomings, he proposes complex embodiment as a way to blend the strengths of each model:
The theory of complex embodiment raises awareness of the effects of disabling
environments on people’s lived experience of the body, but it emphasizes as well
that some factors affecting disability, such as chronic pain, secondary health
effects, and aging, derive from the body (25).
Siebers argues that both medical and social models neglect "human mortality and fragility" as
facts of life. Medical practices have traditionally been developed with the aim of curing or
eliminating disability, while social models sometimes represent accommodation as a solution to
all problems faced by disabled people.
Complex embodiment, in embracing human frailty, counters abled/disabled binaries. For
these binaries are predicated on the "wish to return the body magically to a past era of supposed
perfection" and the "insist[ence] that the body has no value as human variation if it is not
flawless" (26). Such ableist aspirations toward perfection are just as implicated in discussions of
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mental illness. The history of psychosurgical/psychoanalytic treatment shows how a sane/insane
dichotomy long guided medical practices of cure and elimination, and contemporary rhetoric
such as Unger’s shows the enduring rhetorical force of aspirations toward perfect recovery.
If not through conventional narrative, then how can complex embodiment help mad
people to develop and communicate lived knowledge of complicated, hybridized experiences? I
end this project with a much greater consciousness of my inability to provide definitive answers.
Rather, I have done what I can to raise further questions. In scattering fragments of my story
throughout this project, I have aimed to model an alternative to linear narration by blending my
lived knowledge with the narratives and arguments of others. I hope to have contributed, albeit in
a small way, to a discourse that does not require mad people to present our complex and
contingent lived knowledge in a fixed and linear way. Perhaps such a discourse could begin to
include the voices of “unexceptional” mad people—those whose ongoing experiences of
madness may hinder them in crafting conventional rhetoric.
I am willing to lend my voice to whatever kinds of discourse prove most accessible to
people who think and feel in a variety of ways. More important, I am eager to listen.
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